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This paper studies the factors associated with outbound 
bilateral mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity by 
firms located in emerging economies. The authors 
document recent trends in emerging market M&A flows, 
which have risen dramatically over the past decade, 
and explore the factors that may have contributed to 
this rise. They find distinct patterns for M&A deals 
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according to whether the acquisition targets are in other 
emerging economies or advanced countries, and that 
these differences can be attributed to differing theoretical 
motivations behind foreign direct investment. The 
authors also consider the implications of their model for 
future M&A originating in the global South, in light of 
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views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.1 Introduction
The shift of global nancial investment activity away from the advanced world toward emerg-
ing economies has been widely documented, and nowhere is this shift more evident than in
recent patterns of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals. Between 1997 and 2003,
companies based in emerging economies engaged in outbound cross-border M&A deals worth
$189 billion, or 4 percent of the total value of all global cross-border M&A investment. In the
equivalent period from 2004 to 2010, that amount had increased to $1.1 trillion, or 17 percent
of the global total. This sharp rise in emerging economies' share of cross-border M&A has
been accompanied by a deepening reach of emerging-market rms in international capital mar-
kets overall, not just via foreign direct investment (FDI) but also through equity cross-listings,
participation in international loan syndicates, and debt issues on international bond markets.
Given the rising importance of emerging economies in international M&A, the question of
what forces drive their investment activity becomes ever more important. In particular, do
cross-border M&A choices by emerging market rms dier systematically across destination
markets, and if so, what are the dimensions in which these choices dier?
This question is increasingly pertinent as government regulators grapple with the dramatic
pickup in M&A investment by Southern rms in both Northern markets|exemplied by Chi-
nese carmaker Geely's high-prole acquisition of Sweden's Volvo from Ford in 2010|as well as
(and perhaps more importantly) their purchasing activities in the other developing economies
of the South. Indeed, the trend of rising South-North and South-South M&A activity suggests
yet another wrinkle to the Lucas (1990) paradox of \uphill" South-North capital ows: It is
not sucient for theoretical explanations to merely explain why emerging market rms may
be investing in (ostensibly) less risky Northern markets, but also why they may choose to in-
vest in other economies that are otherwise very similar to their own (insofar as their level of
development is concerned), rather than investing at home.
This paper seeks to examine the factors associated with the ow of M&A investment orig-
inating in emerging market economies.1 The empirical analysis relies on bilateral outbound
cross-border M&A data for rms based in 61 emerging markets, collected for the period be-
tween 1997 and 2010. This coverage includes economies from all major developing regions,
which makes this, to our knowledge, one of the most comprehensive analyses of bilateral M&A
activity by the Global South.
The picture of Southern cross-border M&A that emerges from our paper is a fairly sophis-
ticated one. Consistent with other forms of cross-border economic activity, M&A deals reect
standard gravity components, such as economic size and distance. But the strength of existing
trading and investment relationships also matter, and for acquisitions in advanced economy
targets, the informational advantages gleaned from such prior economic relationships appear
to overcome frictions due to physical distance. Moreover, deals in advanced economies tend to
1For the purposes of this paper, emerging economies are dened as 61 (mostly middle-income) economies
traditionally classied as emerging markets by the nancial community. The full list is provided in the annex.
2reect the extent to which FDI can substitute for direct exporting activity, or oer possible di-
versication benets. In contrast, acquisitions in other emerging countries tend to be associated
more with considerations of factor price dierentials. Finally, the ease of nancial access|both
in the home and host economies|appears to facilitate M&A transactions, a result consistent
with the notion that limitations to trade ows may be overcome by substituting capital ows
for goods exports.
We also t our empirical model of M&A deals to a set of growth assumptions for emerging
and advanced economies to obtain a projection of outbound cross-border M&A by emerging
market rms for the period 2010{25. Under plausible scenarios of relative growth rates, we
nd that M&A activity is expected to recover from the crisis-induced decline, and grow at an
average of 8.2 percent annually over the period. This respectable rate nevertheless represents a
moderation in the rate of growth relative to the past, where|for the decade leading up to the
crisis (1998{08)|average annual growth was signicantly higher, at 14.3 percent.
Our ndings corroborate, and extend, the existing literature in several ways. Existing empir-
ical papers on FDI have tended to focus on testing one theoretical framework against another
(Braconier, Norb ack & Urban 2005; Brainard 1997; Head & Ries 2008; Helpman, Melitz &
Yeaple 2004). In contrast, we adopt an agnostic view on the dierent competing theories and
seek instead to test a fairly eclectic set of potential hypotheses. Like several papers in the liter-
ature (Anand & Delios 2002; Blonigen & Piger 2011; Carr, Markusen & Maskus 2001; Makino,
Lau & Yeh 2002), we indeed nd that, depending on the circumstance, dierent theoretical
motivations may drive FDI. Our innovation is to frame these distinct cases in terms of emerging
versus advanced economy target acquisitions.
While a small number of papers have relied on cross-border M&A data (di Giovanni 2005;
M eon & Delannay 2006; Rossi & Volpin 2004), these have tended to be relatively limited in
terms of time period and/or country coverage, and none have explicitly focused on M&A by
emerging economies. Finally, unlike several recent papers, we eschew an explicit focus on
policy- or politically-related factors driving FDI|such as political risk (Busse & Hefeker 2007)
or investment agreements (B uthe & Milner 2008; Neumayer & Spess 2005)|and instead embed
these factors in our overall gravity framework.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we describe some broad stylized
patterns of M&A activity originating from emerging economies (Section 2). This is followed by
an overview, in Section 3, of the dierent theoretical streams that have informed economists'
understanding of bilateral M&A (and FDI, more generally). Section 4 follows with a description
of the dataset, econometric specication, and estimation methodology. Benchmark results and
robustness checks follow (Section 5), before a nal section concludes with some brief thoughts
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Source: Authors' calculations, based on Thomson-Reuters SDC Platinum 
Figure 1: Total cross-border M&A deals by rms from advanced economies and emerging-
market economies, 1997{2010. The upward trend held by emerging market rms is evident in
both absolute deal number and relative deal values.
2 Recent Trends in Emerging Economy M&A
Emerging market multinationals have become far more assertive in their M&A activities on
the global stage over the past decade. Save a dip during the global crisis in 2008 and 2009,
the overall trend in cross-border M&A has been upward, especially in the post-dot-com period
since 2001. This is evident both in terms of the total number of deals (increasing from 661
deals in 2001 to 2,447 in 2010), as well as|perhaps more dramatically|in the value of M&A
deals concluded by emerging economy rms (the rise from $30 to $254 billion over this period
represented an increase in shares from 6 to 29 percent) (see Figure 1).
Although not the focus of this paper, it is illuminative to consider, by way of comparison,
whether patterns in emerging market M&A are also replicated in the other component of FDI,
greeneld activity.2 The share of emerging market greeneld investment did indeed rise between
2001 and 2009 (the latest year data are available), from 12 to 15 percent of total global greeneld
activity. This rise, while clearly more modest, was nevertheless a signicant absolute increase:
the value of cross-border greeneld investment rose from an estimated $98 billion to $250 billion
over the same period.3
2Greeneld investment, as opposed to M&A, typically represents internal, organic corporate growth, while
M&A activity, in addition to satisfying growth objectives, may capture other more complex corporate goals, such
as strategic market penetration or the acquisition of new technology.
3Greeneld data were sourced from UNCTAD and fDi Markets but were, unfortunately, only available for
2003 through 2009. The value for 2001 given here is an exponential projection from the available time series, and
is not meant to be an authoritative gure, but rather to give a sense of the magnitude involved.









































Figure 2: Top source countries of emerging-market cross-border M&A in emerging economies
(left) and advanced economies (right), by value, 1997{2010 total. AFR, EAP, LAC, and MNA
correspond to the World Bank's regional classications for Africa, East Asia and the Pacic,
Latin America and the Caribbean, and Middle East and North Africa.
As may be expected, large and fast-growing emerging economies are responsible for the bulk
of cross-border M&A activity. China is the single largest emerging market source country for
M&A deals, and accounts for $80 and $132 billion of the total $426 and $698 billion invested
in emerging and advanced economies, respectively, over the 1997{2010 time period. Other
emerging economies with signicant presence among source countries include Singapore, the
United Arab Emirates,4 India, and Russia (see Figure 2). Much of these ows are destined for
developed markets|primarily the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia|but
China, Singapore, and Brazil are major destination markets as well.
In terms of sectoral composition, the major emerging market M&A transactions appear in
high-value, nontradable service sectors: nancial services (the top sector for cross-border M&A
activity among emerging-market rms, amounting to $227 million of the total of $1.12 billion
for 1997{2010), telecommunications (a distant second, amounting to $103 million), resource
extraction, and utilities. There is little dierence in the sectoral composition of M&A deals
in emerging versus advanced economies, which suggests that, to the extent that there are dis-
tinct patterns between Southern and Northern investments, they lie more in the nature of the
respective economies, rather than in the type of businesses involved.5
4The relatively high standing of Singapore and the UAE, in spite of their relatively small size, is attributable
to the large number of sovereign wealth fund acquisitions in these economies. Singapore's Temasek Holdings and
GIC Real Estate, for instance, accounted for 32 and 31 deals, respectively, in the sample period.
5The sectoral distribution diers somewhat when considering the number, rather than value, of deals, with
5A casual examination of the actual transactions data suggests that the overall pattern of
cross-border M&A investment by emerging-market rms is consistent with the typical interna-
tional growth strategy of individual corporations. When companies venture abroad, they often
rst establish a small foothold in new markets through branch or representative oces, small
distribution networks, or maintenance centers. Such small greeneld investments can be the
rst step toward execution of a rm's globalization strategy, allowing companies with limited
international exposure to gain experience and local knowledge before making a major com-
mitment to a particular market through an outright acquisition or large-scale investment via
mergers.6 In carrying out M&A transactions, companies often appear to seek more immediate
access to local markets.
Firms may potentially capitalize on technological and informational advantages that may be
gained by their foreign acquisitions, or when they can apply their unique expertise to the same
industries abroad. In particular, emerging-market rms with expertise overcoming the dicult
institutional environment in their home countries may be eager to apply this informational ad-
vantage to similar environments in other emerging markets. Some M&A may also be motivated
by the desire to exploit factor cost dierentials in target markets (relative to their own). Finally,
international M&A activity may demonstrate some persistence, when initial investments lead
to additional cross-border investments through the necessity of the restructuring or upgrading
of acquired assets, or as part of acquiring other rms' vertical- or horizontal-integration growth
strategies.
3 Potential Factors Related to M&A Activity
Economic models of bilateral trade ows have most successfully been modeled on the basis of
an empirical gravity equation, which has more recently been contextualized in the form of a
broad variety of theoretical models (Anderson & van Wincoop 2004). We therefore rely, as a
point of departure, on a gravity equation, where cross-border M&A ows are positively related
to the pair's respective output and negatively related to the bilateral distance between them.
Bilateral country distances capture not only explicit trade costs associated with shipping and
transportation, but could also embed implicit transactions costs related to the deteriorating
quality of an investor's (or acquirer's) knowledge of, and ability to obtain information about,
a potential acquisition target as physical distances between the two countries increase (in line
with the argument made by Loungani, Mody & Razin (2002)). Naturally, existing bilateral
trade ows are also likely to be associated with bilateral M&A ows.
sectors such as professional and technical services, and electronics manufacturing featuring more prominently
in emerging market M&A deals. However, the pattern of overlap in South-North and South-South remains the
same.
6Such staged investment strategies emphasize the real-option aspects. Consequently, the initial greeneld
investment serves is a stepping-stone to understanding a local economy. As uncertainties about demand and
supply become resolved over time, follow-up investments then create a permanent presence in the foreign market
by extending the scope and reach of the initial unit. Gilroy & Lukas (2006) provide the theoretical justication
for this phenomenon, while Brouthers & Dikova (2010) establish empirical evidence.
6In addition to this baseline, however, we supplement the model with a range of theories that
have been put forward to explain cross-border investment activity.
The rst class of theories posit that companies seek growth opportunities abroad as they
outgrow their home markets; a problem especially acute in developing countries. The decision
of multinationals to either horizontally expand to access foreign markets or vertically integrate
production across borders, in turn, depends on both market size and the ability to exploit factor
price dierentials between the two production locations (Helpman & Krugman 1985; Markusen
2002; Markusen & Venables 1998). This result, which relies on relative factor proportions,
suggests that, in addition to absolute GDP, per capita incomes|as a proxy for factor costs|
could be important for M&A choices.
Of course, the implications of the factor proportions hypothesis is not limited to contempo-
raneous dierences in factor prices, but also possible future dierentials. Consequently, relative
growth in both home and destination countries could aect deal ows. This hypothesis can thus
be further tested by including variables that measure GDP and sectoral growth rates. Following
this rationale, faster growth in the home (host) country will exert greater pressure on domestic
(foreign) factor prices and hence increase (reduce) incentives to engage in cross-border M&A.7
A second class of theories revolves around structural economic characteristics of the home
and host countries, especially those related to the extent of trade openness (Brainard 1997;
Helpman et al. 2004; Horstmann & Markusen 1992), but also with regard to dierential access
to nance (either domestic or international), or dierences in the speed of diusion of tech-
nological advances. This tradeo|between proximity to the customer versus concentration of
production|tends to privilege the former especially when transport costs and trade barriers are
substantial or, conversely, when economies of scale favoring home production and subsequently
exporting are relatively low.
Indeed, for economies heavily invested in high-xed, low-marginal cost activities such as
research and development (R&D), the proximity-concentration hypothesis would argue against
FDI (or, at the least, geographically-diused FDI, since pockets of research excellence may
exist in more than one location). Given that emerging economies have now become important
contributors to the advancement of science and technology in their own right, one can further
test this group of hypotheses by including variables directly related to the home country's
capabilities in science and technology, such as the number of patents granted, or through other
indirect measures of innovative capacity, such as the percentage of the population attaining a
tertiary education or the number of engineering graduates in the population. Financial access
can also be captured via measures of international nancial openness (by, for example, private
capital ows as a share of GDP) or the level of domestic nancial development (by, for instance,
the ratio of stock-market capitalization to GDP).
Innovation in the host country may also serve as a justication for M&A. This class of
theories, which focuses on the potential for FDI to facilitate technological and other types of
7However, host growth could also increase its market size in the future, in which case growth could increase
the desire for M&A, leaving the sign of the coecient ambiguous.
7spillovers (Ethier 1986; Fosfuri, Motta & Rnde 2001; Havr anek & I sov a 2012; Rodr guez-Clare
1996), suggests that the desire for technological and knowledge transfer could motivate emerging
market rms to acquire rms in an advanced economy. At the same time, emerging-market rms
may have specialized managerial and operational expertise which the rms could spillover to
markets very similar in nature to their home markets. This technology transfer hypothesis
argues that it is not only the home country's innovative capacity that may inuence M&A
choices, but also that of the host country.
Finally, political and policy factors may play a role in international M&A as well. Possibly
the most likely channel where public policy could aect M&A deal ows is the residual accumu-
lation of reserves as a consequence of existing trade patterns. In addition, policy factors that
may aect M&A could take other forms, such as the presence of bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) (B uthe & Milner 2008; Neumayer & Spess 2005), or risks associated with economic pol-
icy or political conditions (Busse & Hefeker 2007). Accordingly, we cluster these variables into
the class of political economy explanations, which we consider in our empirical work.
4 Data Description and Econometric Methodology
4.1 Data sources and description
The cross-border M&A investment database used for this paper was compiled from a variety
of sources. The primary data for M&A deals were drawn from a larger dataset compiled by
Thompson-Reuters SDC Platinum, which covers all publicly disclosed cross-border transactions
for which the ultimate acquiring company was based in an emerging-market country, and the
immediate target company was located in a country other than that of the ultimate acquirer.
Transactions that were included involved either two or more companies pooling their assets to
form a new entity (a merger), or a foreign company gaining a portion of a domestic company
(an acquisition). All completed and partially completed deals were included, as well as intended
and pending deals announced after September 1, 2009. The denition of a cross-border M&A
transaction used in this paper includes any deal where any equity stake is obtained by the
acquirer rm.8 When no deals were recorded for any country and year, the dependent variable
was coded as zero.9 The compilation resulted in a working database that covers some 10,000
companies from 61 emerging-market economies, over the period between 1997 and 2010.
These were merged with the main independent variables of interest and additional con-
trols, which were drawn from a variety of additional sources. These include macroeconomic
conditions from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) and the IMF's In-
ternational Financial Statistics (IFS); nancial factors from Dealogic DCM Analytics, MSCI,
8This grouping includes investments where share purchases resulted in acquisitions of less than 10 per cent of
a rm's voting shares, a narrower but commonly-used denition of FDI.
9The database also provides historical information on acquirer and target countries (both immediate and
ultimate), status, sector, and consideration oered. These were used in the section describing stylized facts in
the data, but were excluded from the econometric analysis.
8and J.P. Morgan; commodity prices from Goldman Sachs and the World Bank's Development
Prospects Group; bilateral investment treaties from UNCTAD; country risk and institutional
indicators from the PRS Group's International Country Risk Guide (ICRG); and technology
and innovation indicators from the World Intellectual Property Organization. Depending on
the specication, the dataset is an unbalanced panel that includes between 29,995 and 55,497
observations.10
4.2 Econometric specication and estimation
The econometric model we use is an augmented gravity model that species that the number of
cross-border M&A deals originating in country i (\home") and destined for country j (\host")
at time t, Mijt, is a function of each country's output in that period, Yit and Yjt, the (time-
invariant) bilateral distance between them, Dij, and additional factors:




kGt + ijt; (1)
where X and Z are vectors of home- and host-country characteristics, respectively, B is a
vector of other variables capturing the bilateral economic relationship between the home and
host countries, and G is a vector of additional controls representing global macroeconomic and
nancial conditions. To maintain parsimony, we nest the two possible host targets within (1),
so that the various coecients|, , , , and  |are allowed to vary by host-country class
(advanced, AD, or emerging, EM), so that k = fAD;EMg.
Variables considered within X and Z are informed by the dierent theoretical approaches
outlined in Section 3. These include, inter alia, GDP growth (corresponding to the factor pro-
portions hypothesis), trade openness (corresponding to the proximity-concentration hypothesis),
patents granted (corresponding to technology transfer arguments), and international reserve
holdings (corresponding to political economy explanations). Additional variables included to
account for the bilateral relationship between country pairs include factors such as the existing
size of bilateral trade and the existence of a BIT between the two economies.
In our benchmark regressions, (1) was estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with
two-dimensional clustering for standard errors (by country-pair and time), designed to correct
for both heteroskedasticity across countries and serial correlation within countries. Because
distance is time-invariant (and we are interested in the signs and magnitudes of the coecient
3), we do not introduce country-pair xed eects. Moreover, given the inclusion of global
variables, we exclude time xed eects from the benchmark in order to minimize the incidence
of multicollinearity, although we explore this possibility in our robustness checks.
10The technical appendix provides detailed descriptions of each variable and its source in Table A.2, along with
summary statistics for major variables of interest in Table A.3.
95 Empirical Results and Robustness Checks
5.1 Benchmark results
Our benchmark results are reported in Table 1, for three main specications: (B1) A bare-bones
specication that comprises the standard components of a gravity model (GDP and distance);
(B2) A parsimonious specication that includes only one representative variable from each
family of hypotheses elaborated on in Section 3,11 along with the main control variables such
as bilateral trade ows and global macroeconomic conditions; and (B3) A fully specied model
that includes all the variables of interest associated with the various theoretical hypotheses.12
Although we consider the nal specication, (B3), to be the most complete representation of
(1), the sample size is much smaller (about half of the rst specication), and the goodness-of-t
improves only marginally from specication (B2). Nevertheless, some additional insight can be
gleaned from the more stripped-down specications. In particular, variables that are signicant
in a less elaborate specication typically survive the more comprehensive one (and always retain
their signs). This suggests that such variables carry considerable explanatory power.
In general, the basic gravity model variables|economic size and distance|enter with highly
signicant coecients (with the exception of distance in the nal specication). The coecients
on both home and host GDP are positive and signicant, which is consistent with theoretical pri-
ors: large economies tend to engage in a greater amount of cross-border economic activity, M&A
included. In terms of magnitude, the eect is several times larger for acquisitions in developed
versus emerging markets; this suggests that only rms from relatively large emerging economies
have the means to pursue expansion in advanced economies through M&A. Interestingly, these
relative magnitudes are reversed when considering host GDP, which means that these rms are
also far more likely to pursue opportunities in larger emerging economies, compared to advanced
ones.
While distance from other emerging economies|a proxy for transactions costs, which can
include informational costs13|decreases M&A when considering emerging market targets, it
actually increases when considering advanced economy rms. While seemingly paradoxical,
this can be understood by recognizing that transactions costs vis- a-vis developed countries are
likely to be fairly low, and so other factors are more likely to predominate in any M&A decision.
Indeed, the positive coecient is only statistically signicant in one specication, suggesting
11These are (theoretical family in parentheses): per capita GDP (factor proportions), trade openness
(proximity-concentration), host patents granted (technology transfer), and both reserves and economic risk,
since these capture distinctly dierent types of political-economy eects.
12In the third specication, the standard error for emerging host GDP is not reported. This arises due to
collinearity. However, given the importance of GDP in the model, we have chosen to retain the variable in the
specication, keeping in mind that the coecients of variables that are highly correlated with GDP should be
interpreted with caution (coecients for non-collinear variables are unaected).
13The quality of an investor's information about a potential acquisition target decreases as the distance between
the two counties increases, whereas the costs of communication, coordination, and monitoring all increase with
distance. At the same time, rms tend to be more knowledgeable about the nancial, legal, and political
environments of economies in close geographical proximity to their own. Proximity would thus reduce the cost
of acquiring and operating subsidiaries.
10Table 1: Benchmark regressions for factors associated with number
of cross-border outbound M&A investments from emerging economies,
1997{2009
B1 B2 B3
to EM to AD to EM to AD to EM to AD
Home country characteristics
GDP 4.781 17.060 2.728 8.391 3.714 8.158
(1.10) (4.00) (1.01) (0.92) (1.38) (2.20)
GDP per capita -0.672 -0.616 -0.321 -1.770
(0.64) (0.64) (1.00) (0.83)
GDP growth -0.350 1.136
(0.48) (0.76)
Trade 5.096 3.751 5.232 2.458
openness (1.81) (1.32) (2.11) (1.69)
Financial 0.227 -0.737
openness (0.33) (0.45)




Reserves -1.276 1.179 -2.218 1.356
(0.44) (0.31) (0.72) (0.78)
Economic 0.684 0.481 0.986 -0.296




GDP 6.899 1.652 3.706 0.752 1.139 0.844
(3.28) (0.45) (1.99) (0.36) (0.41)
GDP per capita -1.227 0.921 -0.646 0.701
(0.49) (0.30) (0.53) (0.30)
GDP growth 0.312 0.355
(0.56) (1.37)
Trade 1.994 -1.865 1.797 -3.257
openness (0.72) (0.81) (0.78) (1.36)
Financial 0.339 0.122
openness (0.15) (0.08)
Stock market -0.080 2.926
capitalization (0.53) (0.75)
Patents -6.219 -2.622 -8.283 -5.886
granted (2.69) (0.83) (3.54) (1.28)
Reserves -0.694 -0.552 0.616 -0.099
(0.28) (0.31) (1.15) (0.32)
Economic 0.420 -1.224 0.163 -2.656




Distance -3.810 0.229 -1.236 2.025 -0.838 0.325
(0.76) (0.56) (0.55) (0.73) (0.68) (0.80)
Bilateral 2.583 0.551 3.013 0.501




10-yr Treasury -1.575 4.472 -1.646 2.156
rate (1.34) (1.23) (0.67) (0.87)
Energy price -0.958 -0.288 -1.311 -0.536
index (0.06) (0.18) (0.53) (0.53)
Agricultural 0.164 -0.302 0.921 1.098
price index (0.01) (0.27) (0.59) (0.60)
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.078 0.275 0.275 0.289 0.289
F 128.162 128.162 32.686 32.686 20.998 20.998
N 55,497 55,497 37,909 37,909 29,995 29,995
y Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors, clustered by time and country-pair,
are reported in parentheses. A constant term were included in the regressions, but not reported. 
indicates signicance at 10 percent level,  indicates signicance at 5 percent level, and  indicates
signicance at 1 percent level.
11that other factors are in fact more critical. In addition, the positive and signicant coecient
on bilateral trade ows corroborates this notion, since preexisting trading relationships implies
lower transactions costs, which serves to facilitate greater M&A activity.
The signs and statistical signicance of coecients on the other theoretically-motivated
variables suggest that many of the hypotheses put forth in Section 3 have some merit.
The level of host-country development, as measured by per capita GDP, negatively aects
acquisitions in emerging destination countries, but is positive for advanced-country targets.
This would suggest that rms acquire assets in other emerging economies that have not yet
attained a certain level of development|as measured by per capita GDP|so as to exploit
factor price dierentials (recall, the emerging economy acquirer rms in the sample typically
hail from middle-income countries). Acquisitions in advanced economies, in contrast, do not
oer positive wage dierentials, and so the positive coecient on per capita GDP in that case
would simply mean that more developed economies tend to attract more M&As, since there are
likely to be more acquisition targets available. This could especially be the case for acquisitions
in services|as discussed in Section 2, deals in service-related sectors account for a signicant
share of all M&A activity|since countries with higher levels of per capita GDP also typically
possess larger service sectors.
As expected, the greater a home country's participation in the global economy, as measured
by its trade ows, the greater its M&A ows. To a lesser extent, this is also reected by its for-
eign currency reserves. A country whose rms trade more frequently with advanced (emerging)
economies tends to build up foreign reserves faster (slower), which makes the country's com-
panies more (less) likely to engage in acquisitions in their target markets (hence the positive
coecient on home reserve holdings for advanced economy M&A, and conversely for emerging
economy M&A).
The coecients on trade openness in the host country are far more interesting. For ac-
quisitions in advanced countries, less restrictive economies|as proxied by a greater degree of
trade openness|will tend to attract less M&A, since emerging markets can simply choose the
exporting rather than FDI route to penetrate those markets. In this sense, the two are sub-
stitutes, an interpretation entirely consistent with the proximity-concentration hypothesis. In
contrast, acquisitions in emerging markets appear to be complements. Since barriers to the
ow of goods and services tend to be signicantly higher in most developing countries, a given
marginal reduction in trade restrictiveness will have less of an eect. Thus, instead of choos-
ing the route of exporting goods, rms export capital instead, by establishing an operational
presence in such countries. The positive and signicant coecient on the distance variable for
ows to advanced economies can, in fact, be viewed as further corroboration of this proximity-
concentration tradeo.
The additional measures that capture nancial access also indicate that, overall, a greater
level of access to nance is associated with more M&A activity. For instance, the ability of
rms in the home economy to raise capital (through its domestic stock market, for example)
12can promote M&A, as can nancial depth in the host country. By relaxing constraints to
nancing, barriers to horizontal rm expansion are lowered, and rms are encouraged to pursue
the M&A route.
The negative and signicant coecients on the innovation variable in the host country lend
little support to the technology transfer argument. Indeed, across all specications, emerging
economy rms appear to invest less in countries with more granted patents.14 This could
be, in part, because emerging economies now already account for a signicant share of global
innovation (Aizenman & Noy 2007; World Bank 2011), and it is the emerging economies that
engage in the technology transfer to less innovative host nations. Whatever the motivation, the
evidence does suggest that, if rms choose to pursue cross-border M&A, it seems unlikely that
they do so for reasons of acquiring technology.
Finally, there is some evidence that political and policy variables make a dierence to M&A.
BITs are positively related to acquisitions in emerging economy country-pairs, and the magni-
tude of this eect is substantial (although the coecient is only marginally statistically signif-
icant). In particular, the positive and signicant eect of political stability on acquisitions in
advanced countries seems to suggest that rms actively seek to lower their political-risk expo-
sure through their M&A activities in advanced economies (since higher values of the measure
indicate less risk).15 Similarly, rms from more economically stable emerging economies are
more likely to seek to diversify their exposure by acquisitions in other emerging markets.
5.2 Robustness checks
To examine the strength of the results reported in Table 1, we experiment with two sets of
additional robustness checks. The rst set of checks allows for additional factors that may be
associated with cross-border M&A, or alternative measures of existing variables. In the interest
of space, and given the relatively good performance of the parsimonious model (B2), we rely
on this specication as the basis for the robustness tests to follow.16 The results of this rst set
of checks are reported in Table 2.
In the benchmark models, per capita GDP was used as a proxy for factor prices. While
doing so considerably expands the data coverage, there may be concern that this measure may
be capturing other relevant factors beyond factor prices per se. For example, GDP per capita|
14One argument against this is that patents may reect the extent to which the legal structure of the country
supports patent lings, rather than innovation. While this may be true, the legal environment is controlled, in
part, by our inclusion of the political risk variable. Furthermore, we regard the patent data as the best proxy that
we have available for measuring innovative capacity. As an additional robustness check, however, we substitute
the total patents measure with data that includes only cross-border patents granted (which arguably better
controls for dierences in domestic patent law). While the results are somewhat weaker, the qualitative message
remains unchanged; these additional results are available on request.
15M&A activity does not, however, appear to respond to political risk measures in South-South acquisitions.
This suggests that the hypothesis that emerging market rms may exploit their comparative advantage in more
challenging institutional environments is not supported by the evidence presented here, a result that has also
been corroborated by others (Arita forthcoming).




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14as a measure of the overall level of development of the host country|could reect the overall
quality of acquisition targets in a country, or perhaps the extent to which property rights of
foreign entities are respected. While we have sought to account for these additional intervening
eects via our controls, it is worthwhile including factor prices directly into the benchmark.
This is done in column (R1), where we have introduced total wages paid to employees in
the manufacturing sector as an additional measure of factor price dierentials. The negative
(and signicant) coecient further corroborates the factor proportions hypothesis, although the
magnitude of the eect is quantitatively small (a reduction of one advanced economy M&A deal
requires an increase in host wages of twenty percent).
To further explore the robustness of the proximity-concentration nding, we consider two
perturbations to the benchmark: in column (R2), we substitute stock market capitalization with
the stock market turnover ratio; and in column (R3), we add domestic credit to the private
sector (as a share of GDP) to further approximate the importance of domestic nancial depth.17
As was the case in the benchmark, nancial depth (whether in the home or host country), when
signicant, is positively associated with greater M&A (stock market turnover was statistically
insignicant).
An alternative measure of host-country innovative capacity is expenditure on R&D, as a
share of GDP. When we substitute the patents measure of the benchmark|shown in column
(R4)|the sample size decreases signicantly, but the negative coecient fails to reverse (al-
though in this case it is insignicant).18
Finally, we consider supplementing the political economy variables with two alternatives.
First, we include nancial instead of political risk, as reported in column (R5). Home economies
that experience lower levels of nancial risk tend to increase their acquisitions in advanced
markets|perhaps, as before, to meet diversication objectives|and the converse holds true for
host economies: less risky Northern markets may attract less Southern M&A, perhaps because
they oer a less attractive risk-return reward. In the nal column, (R6), we introduce corporate
bond issuance and sovereign risk of the home economy as additional factors that may inuence
cross-border M&A. These appear to have little eect, although the coecient for sovereign risk
is marginally (and negatively) signicant.
In all of these specications, the coecients for the other main variables of interest remain
largely unchanged.
The second set of robustness checks that we consider are dierent estimation strategies for
the benchmark. As before, we utilize the parsimonious model (B2) for our analyses. Table 3
reports three alternative estimation methods that we consider. In column (E1), we substitute
17Another alternative could be to substitute the de facto measure of nancial openness with a de jure one, such
as the Chinn & Ito (2008) index. Doing so changes the signicance of the coecient on nancial openness for
advanced economy acquisitions (it becomes negative and signicant), results analogous to the nding for trade
openness. The other coecients are qualitatively unchanged, and we do not report this specication, although
these are available on request.
18We also considered, but do not report, the share of researchers in the population as yet another measure of
innovative capacity. Again, the qualitative results remain, and details are available on request.
15two-dimensional standard errors clustering with two-way xed eects (by country-pair and
time), along with Huber-White robust standard errors. In column (E2), we introduce three-
way xed eects (by each respective country and time), and in the third column, (E3), we use
a random eects (RE) model with robust standard errors and errors clustered by country-pair.
The nal column (E4) apples seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) with correlated country-
pairs and a common AR(1) error.19 The rst two FE approaches allow for ever-greater levels
of unobserved heterogeneity, while the latter two error components models accept somewhat
less clustering in the error structure, in exchange for greater eciency in estimation (while still
correcting standard errors for the panel nature of the data); the latter approach has also been
applies by others in the literature (such as, for example, Head & Ries (2008)).
It is evident that the main results that obtained from our benchmark specications remain
unaected by these alternative estimation approaches. It is useful to recognize that this is in
spite of the far greater heterogeneity that is aorded by the xed eects estimators (E1) and
(E2). Indeed, the qualitatively consistent results reported in Table 3 suggest that the simpler
(and more ecient) OLS estimation employed in our benchmark was a reasonable choice.
5.3 Will M&A ows change substantially in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis?
As discussed in Section 2, cross-border M&A ows by emerging market rms fell substantially
during the later crisis period, and in the year following. The natural question that arises is
whether such ows are likely to change substantially as a result of the crisis, especially with
anticipated slower growth in advanced economies.
Using the model developed in Section 4,20 we project M&A deal trends for 2010 through
2025. Obviously, forecasts of most independent variables were not available. We retained
2009 values for all but GDP and net international investment position (IIP)-related variables
(specically, GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth, and net IIP, used to infer reserve holdings),
and simulated the model using these assumptions for emerging and advanced aggregates. The
main assumptions are summarized in Table 4 for two scenarios: a baseline where emerging
economies are assumed to grow, on average, twice as fast as advanced economies; and a high-
growth scenario for emerging markets where the largest emerging countries (China, India, and
Russia) grow faster than the rest of the large emerging economies (such as Brazil, Indonesia,
and Korea).
The results of the two scenarios are summarized in Figure 3. Future cross-border deals are
likely to grow at a sustained, albeit slower, pace. Projections along the baseline scenario suggest
that the pace of cross-border deal growth is likely to slow from the 14.3 percent annual growth
rate recorded between 1998 and 2008, to an average of 8.9 percent annual growth over 2010{
19Variants of this feasible generalized least squares approach, for example by allowing panel-specic errors or
independent country-pairs, did not qualitatively change the results.
20In contrast to the regression analyses, we utilize a slightly dierent specication (B3) here in order to minimize
data demands while maximizing the historical t of the model. Details of the model used for the projections are
detailed in the annex.
16Table 3: Robustness regressions for alternative estimation methods for number of cross-border
outbound M&A investments from emerging economies, 1997{2009
E1 E2 E3 E4
to EM to AD to EM to AD to EM to AD to EM to AD
Home country characteristics
GDP -5.448 21.707 -3.838 2.067 1.661 11.670 5.082 6.794
(4.48) (8.49) (2.31) (2.37) (1.85) (3.47) (0.57) (0.26)
GDP per 4.723 2.315 3.144 2.990 1.340 0.614 -0.472 -0.056
capita (2.35) (1.95) (1.03) (1.05) (0.94) (0.87) (0.10) (0.05)
Trade 2.858 0.722 2.353 0.977 3.966 2.763 4.562 3.282
openness (2.43) (1.07) (0.82) (0.85) (1.80) (1.14) (0.60) (0.06)
Reserves 0.144 -0.231 -0.787 1.608 -0.648 0.652 -0.749 1.663
(0.27) (1.19) (0.25) (0.28) (0.30) (0.93) (0.12) (0.20)
Economic 0.048 -0.330 -0.081 0.046 0.182 -0.146 0.481 0.529
risk (0.17) (0.28) (0.33) (0.42) (0.20) (0.28) (0.16) (0.11)
Host country characteristics
GDP 19.805 2.425 13.623 1.847 9.287 0.896 3.143 0.811
(10.97) (2.22) (2.64) (0.68) (4.93) (0.50) (0.77) (0.77)
GDP per -0.370 1.036 -1.439 1.041 -1.311 0.691 -1.518 0.704
capita (1.64) (0.61) (1.39) (0.88) (0.77) (0.29) (0.40) (0.31)
Trade 2.453 -3.639 2.058 -4.144 2.945 -1.672 1.712 -2.194
openness (1.35) (1.62) (0.94) (2.27) (1.10) (0.96) (0.45) (0.93)
Patents -3.511 0.842 -5.142 0.253 -4.028 -2.223 -3.111 -2.892
granted (1.60) (1.38) (1.42) (2.06) (1.90) (0.85) (0.89) (0.23)
Reserves -1.934 0.065 -2.005 0.062 -1.059 -0.012 -0.909 -0.722
(0.96) (0.20) (0.27) (0.24) (0.46) (0.19) (0.14) (0.11)
Economic -0.350 -0.038 -0.267 0.533 -0.220 0.011 0.476 0.040
risk (0.36) (0.75) (0.33) (0.91) (0.34) (0.70) (0.12) (0.46)
Country-pair characteristics
Distance -2.942 -2.131 -2.150 1.747 -2.649 2.283
(0.24) (0.44) (0.51) (0.59) (0.42) (0.42)
Bilateral 1.310 0.493 2.510 0.541 1.540 0.527 1.642 0.587
trade ows (0.62) (0.09) (0.03) (0.01) (0.69) (0.09) (0.11) (0.04)
Adjusted R2 0.096 0.096 0.207 0.207 0.263 0.263
R2 (within) 0.097 0.097 0.093 0.093
R2 (between) 0.310 0.310
F 6.767 6.767 251.5 251.5
Wald 2 279.1 279.1 10,182.5 10,182.5
Estimator 2-way FE 2-way FE 3-way FE 3-way FE RE RE SUR-PCSE SUR-PCSE
N 37,909 37,909 37,909 37,909 37,909 37,909 37,909 37,909
y Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors (all specications), clustered by country-pair (third spec-
ication), are reported in parentheses. Global controls and a constant term were included in the regressions, but not
reported.  indicates signicance at 10 percent level,  indicates signicance at 5 percent level, and  indicates
signicance at 1 percent level.
17Table 4: Growth and net IIP assumptions for emerging and advanced
economies, by scenario, 2010{25y
Baseline High growth
2010 2025 Average 2010 2025 Average
GDP growth (%)
Emerging 6.2 3.9 4.7 6.2 4.4 4.9
Advanced 2.2 1.5 2.3 2.2 1.5 2.3
GDP (USD trillion)
Emerging 21.6 43.7 21.6 44.8
Advanced 39.5 56.2 39.5 56.2
GDP per capita growth (%)
Emerging 5.6 3.6 4.2 5.6 4.0 4.4
Advanced 1.7 1.3 1.9 1.7 1.3 1.9
Net IIP (USD trillion)
Emerging 2.7 15.2 2.7 15.2
Advanced -2.4 -9.8 -2.4 -9.8
* GDP levels are measured in constant 2009 U.S. dollars.
20 (9.0 percent in the high-growth scenario), and to an average of 6.7 percent annual growth
between 2020 and 2025 (7.0 percent in the high-growth scenario).
Consistent with the past decade, the expansion of nancial globalization, as measured by the
rate of growth of cross-border deals, is expected to exceed that of real economic growth: Growth
in cross-border deals is likely to outpace expected emerging-market GDP annual growth rates of
4.9 percent over 2010{20, and 4.1 percent over 2020{25. This expected growth in cross-border
deals echoes a global trend of nancial growth generally exceeding growth in real economic
variables.
Preliminary evidence from M&A activity for 2010 and 2011 is supportive of this reasonably
rapid recovery from the crisis. Indeed, as evident in Figure 1, deal activity by emerging market
rms in 2010 has already exceeded pre-crisis peaks, and M&A activity in 2011 appears well
on track for the full recovery, in 2013, implied by our projections. This is also supported by
country-level evidence. Outbound cross-border M&A deals concluded by Chinese rms, for
example, reached 744 deals in 2010 and 909 deals in 2011, levels comparable to (and in excess
of) the pre-crisis peak of 760 deals, attained in 2007.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored the factors associated with bilateral M&A activity by emerging
market rms. Our main nding is that these rms' decisions to pursue acquisition targets depend
critically on whether they are investing in advanced or emerging market targets. Southern
acquisitions tend to be located in countries with lower levels of per capita income, which likely
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Figure 3: Model projection (hollow and dotted lines) and actual historical data (solid line)
for outbound cross-border M&A deals by rms in emerging-market economies, 1998{2025, for
baseline (left panel) and high-growth (right panel) scenarios. Shaded areas indicate the projec-
tion period. Forward projections based on growth and net IIP assumptions for emerging and
advanced economies.
Northern targets, in contrast, occur in greater frequency when these host countries are more
closed to trade, which suggests that such deals may be due to an implicit tradeo that favors
siting production directly in the country, rather than exporting to it.
Another important insight that emerges from the analysis is that rms appear to seek to
diversify their equity holdings through acquisitions. More specically, while emerging economy
acquirers are likely to be located in economically less volatile economies, they tend to seek
out targets in advanced economies that exhibit both lower levels of political risk (to insure
the protection of their investments), but higher levels of economic and nancial risk (possibly
because such economies can oer better returns). The extent to which such diversication occurs
is also materially aected by economic policies, such as those governing bilateral investment or
nancial access.
In light of this, emerging market rms are likely to press for future economic policies that
will strengthen investment climates both at home and abroad. In doing so, emerging market
rms can act as catalysts that spur increased integration of developing countries into the global
economy, since enhanced integration oers additional support for open trading and investment
regimes. But these rms will also serve as a growing source of global competition, especially
when they invest in other emerging economies. Emerging market acquisitions are increasingly
driven by resource- and eciency-seeking motives|motives traditionally considered the pre-
serve of rms based in advanced countries|and in making such cross-border investments, these
rms will also challenge advanced-country rms' preeminence in industrial production. Such
competition will, in the longer run, drive global factor price equalization in general, and wage
convergence in particular. Countries can support such positive competition by enhancing nan-
cial access within their countries, which is also positively associated with cross-border M&A.
19The slow post-crisis recovery in the developed world, coupled with the relatively rapid
recovery in the developing one, has underscored the future economic potential of emerging
markets. Projections of post-crisis M&A volume by emerging market rms suggest that future
M&A activity, while moderating somewhat, is likely to remain fairly robust. Emerging market
rms are thus likely to be at the forefront of this process of global economic convergence, and are
fast becoming a potent force for globalization in their own right. Future research in this area will
do well to study how the economic behavior of such globalized emerging market multinationals
may dier from those of advanced country corporations, beyond their choices in cross-border
M&A.
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22Technical Appendix
Projection Model Details
Our M&A growth projections are based on a modied version of the model (1), and is designed
to minimize data requirements for forward variables while maximizing the t of the model
to historical data. We use specication (B3) in Table 1 as a starting point, and introduce a
lagged dependent variable to the regressors. The model is then estimated with the full set of
explanatory variables, and insignicant variables are then sequentially dropped. The process is
repeated until the most parsimonious specication is reached. Due to data limitations, a smaller
panel is used, which includes 53 countries for which full data are available. The country-specic
variables are further simplied by classifying host countries two groups, either advanced or
emerging.
The projections are based on the two sets of assumptions regarding GDP, GDP per capita,
and net IIP detailed in Table 4. These assumptions correspond to a growth scenario where all
countries grow at a rate consistent with their potential output, allowing for short-run deviations
in the short term (from 2011{12, where we use the World Bank's forecasts published in the Global
Economic Prospects report). Per capita calculations are obtained by supplementing the growth-
implied GDP levels with UN population projections. Reserve holdings are assumed to grow as a
constant fraction of the net IIP position. A number of variables, such as corporate bonds issues,
are assumed to grow at historical rates (for the 1997{2008 period). Other variables, such as
economic risk, political risk, and participation in global trade are assumed to remain constant
throughout the projection period. The tted model is generally robust to small deviations
in most of the independent variables, but is sensitive to assumptions about reserve holdings
growth.
23Additional Tables





Bahamas, The India Qatar
Bahrain Indonesia Romania
Barbados Jamaica Russian Federation
Belarus Jordan Saudi Arabia
Brazil Kazakhstan Singapore
Bulgaria Kenya South Africa
Chile Kuwait Korea, Rep. of
China Latvia Sri Lanka
Colombia Lebanon Thailand
Costa Rica Lithuania Trinidad and Tobago
Croatia Malaysia Turkey
Czech Republic Mexico Ukraine
Dominican Republic Mongolia UAE
Ecuador Morocco Uruguay
Egypt, Arab Rep. Nigeria Venezuela, RB
El Salvador Oman Vietnam
Estonia Pakistan
Georgia Panama
y The denition of emerging economies used in the paper were chosen
on the basis of markets traditionally classied as emerging by invest-
ment banks, and to illustrate the economies that were distinct from
the historically advanced economies of North America, Western Eu-
rope, Japan, and Oceania. China data aggregate the mainland and
the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau.
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